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Too Much of a Good Thing in
Lubanga and Haradinaj: The Danger
of Expediency in International
Criminal Trials
Heidi L. Hansberry *
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi
Brahimaj (Haradinaj) at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo (Lubanga) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) illustrate
several challenges faced by international tribunals. First, these cases
demonstrate that international tribunals must balance the dual
priorities of expediency and the protection of those involved with the
proceedings. A second, related challenge that these cases reveal is
the difficulty of preserving a trial chamber’s 1 discretionary authority
while simultaneously limiting the abuse of power and maintaining
fair and expeditious proceedings.
Recent actions by judges in international tribunals indicate
that judges tend to consider any reason for delay as unjustified and to
be avoided at all costs in order to promote trial expediency. This
article seeks to show that delays concerning the protection of


*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, expected May 2012, Northwestern University School
of Law. Heidi Hansberry completed a Northwestern University School of Law
International Externship at the International Criminal Court during the fall of
2010. The views expressed in this article are strictly her own. She wishes to thank
Ambassador and Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law David
Scheffer, who provided invaluable guidance and feedback throughout all stages of
this article.
1
The trial chamber is the component of the ICC and ICTY tasked with conducting
trials, as distinct from the pre-trial chamber and the appeals chamber.
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individuals involved in court proceedings 2 must be viewed
differently, as the Haradinaj Appeals Chamber correctly observes.
If a court will not ensure the safety of those involved, witnesses and
others will be less likely to come forward and be truthful, and the
trial will be severely handicapped. Thus, this article will argue that
the urge to rush matters regarding protection must be tamed.
Following a background section, Part One of this article will
analyze the protection dilemmas encountered by the Haradinaj and
Lubanga courts. Next, it will explain the legal basis for the
discretionary decisions made by the respective trial chambers,
namely the Haradinaj Trial Chamber’s refusal to delay proceedings
to accommodate witnesses with protection concerns and the
Lubanga Trial Chamber’s stay of proceedings, which resulted from a
stalemate between the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor regarding
witness protection issues.
Part Two of this article will explain the significance of the
trial chambers’ discretion and describe how it can both achieve and
undermine goals related to the protection of individuals involved
with the tribunals. This section will closely analyze the different
outcomes of the protection issues in Haradinaj and Lubanga and the
implications of the trial chambers’ decisions.
Part Three of this article will evaluate the appeals chambers’
effectiveness in resolving the issues presented in the two cases. It
will argue that the Haradinaj Appeals Chamber took a strong stance
against the Trial Chamber’s abuse of discretion and, therefore,
provided clear guidance regarding the conduct of trial chambers in
relation to witness protection. The appeals decision in Lubanga,
however, did little to clarify how the Trial Chamber ought to handle
protection disagreements in the future. In part because the issue was
not ripe, the Appeals Chamber did not address the Lubanga Trial
Chamber’s discretion in the context of protection, nor did it assign
weight to the competing concerns of expediency and the protection
of individuals involved with the court proceedings.
Part Four will conclude that protection of witnesses and
others involved in the court proceedings should trump concerns
about expediency because the lack of adequate and timely protective
measures could lead to a variety of undesirable and ironic
repercussions.

2

Throughout this article, this phrase will collectively refer to defense witnesses,
prosecution witnesses, and dual status victim-witnesses.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Issue of Expediency
1. Statistics regarding the pace of international criminal trials

There have been no completed trials to date at the ICC,
which was born upon the Rome Statute’s entry into force on July 1,
2002. 3 Statistics reflect that an accused person spends an average of
2.3 years awaiting trial at the ICC while in custody. 4 The average
time period between custody and a decision on charges, the first step
toward a trial at the ICC, alone is 0.9 years. 5 Similarly, the time
period between Bahr Idriss Abu Garda’s voluntary appearance and
the decision on charges was 0.7 years. 6 Thus, it is typical that an
exceedingly long period of time elapses before the trial itself
begins—even for those defendants who appear voluntarily. And
although no trials have concluded at the ICC, the first two trials
promise to be lengthy. At the time of writing, the trial of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo has been underway for over two years, since January
26, 2009, and the trial of Germain Katanga and Matheiu Ngudjolo
Chui, which began on November 24, 2009, approaches its two-year
anniversary. 7
The ICTY’s statistics are similar to those of the ICC, in spite
of the fact that the ICTY was established much earlier, in May
1993, 8 and that it has completed many more trials, 126 to date. 9 The
average duration of an ICTY trial is 1.4 years, and the pre-trial phase
lasts approximately 1.9 years. 10

3

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]
(entered into force July 1, 2002).
4
See Annex 1, a table with data regarding the length of time between the major
events in trials at the ICC, current through July 12, 2011.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited
July 24, 2011).
9
See Key Figures, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited July
24, 2011).
10
Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Trials, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L.
79, 117 (2009); see also Maximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial
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These statistics are not unique to the ICC and ICTY. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also have lengthy trials (an average
of 2.2 years and 3.5 years, respectively) and long pre-trial phases (an
average of 3.6 years and 1.4 years, respectively). 11 Even more
shocking is the average length of time between custody and the
ultimate judgment: 4.7 years (ICTY), 5.9 years (ICTR), and 4.8
years (SCSL). 12
2. Causes of the slow pace and proposed solutions

Stating that lengthy proceedings are the biggest problem of
international criminal trials, Robert Heinsch enumerated six main
reasons for the slow pace of international criminal trials. 13 First, the
enormous amount of disclosed material overburdens the defense.14
Second, the Office of the Prosecutor should, but does not, facilitate
the work of the defense by structuring its disclosures and
streamlining its cases, so as to create less labor for the defense. 15
Faced with more work, the defense often requests time extensions, a
big contributor to the slow pace of proceedings. 16 Heinsch’s third
point is that judges are not proactive enough in encouraging
cooperation between the parties. 17 Fourth, judges are hindered by a
lack of information on the background of cases; most significantly,

Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical
Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 241, 253 (2010) (Using
statistics current through July, 2006: “The median length of the pre-trial phase is
about 18 months (551 days). The trial phase with guilty pleas included has a
median length of about 14 months (433 days), while the trial phase without guilty
pleas has a median length of about 17 months (515 days).”).
11
See Gailbraith, supra note 10, at 117.
12
Id. Note that there is often a substantial amount of time that elapses after an
accused individual is taken into custody prior to his or her initial appearance at the
tribunal (i.e. the commencement of the pre-trial phase). See Langer & Doherty,
supra note 10, at 253–54.
13
Robert Heinsch, How to achieve fair and expeditious trial proceedings before
the ICC: Is it time for a more judge-dominated approach?, in THE EMERGING
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 480, 481 (Carsten Stahn &
Göran Sluiter, eds., 2009).
14
Id. at 483.
15
Id. at 485–86, 491.
16
Id. at 486.
17
Id. at 487–88.
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they lack awareness of exculpatory material. 18
Fifth, selfrepresented defendants, rather than experienced attorneys, are
allowed to participate in international criminal trials, causing
unnecessary delays about basic issues. 19 Sixth, the participation of
victims throws off the equilibrium of a typical trial, and, absent a
proactive bench, delays ensue. 20
Summarizing the difficulty in finding a solution to the slow
pace of international criminal tribunals, Jean Galbraith noted that
there are two typical, yet problematic strategies, which often conflict
with each other and with the primary objectives of these tribunals. 21
The first strategy is to abbreviate historical record-building efforts
and to devote less time to helping transitioning societies achieve
peace. 22 The second strategy is to speed up procedural aspects of
trial, which creates due process concerns. 23 Galbraith disagreed with
these strategies and suggested plea bargaining and multi-defendant
trials as the proper solutions to the slow pace of the international
criminal legal system. 24
The ICTY has also targeted the problem of pace. Its attempts
to shorten trials and expedite proceedings, however, have had ironic
results, according to one report. 25 In its implementation of so-called
managerial reforms, the ICTY actually lengthened the average
duration of proceedings, according to the report’s analysis. 26 These
managerial reforms included, inter alia, allowing judges to actively
manage the pre-trial and trial phases, permitting more written
witness statements in lieu of live testimony, granting trial chambers
the authority to permit or reject applications for interlocutory
appeals, and limiting, at the trial stage, the number of sites and
incidents under review. 27 This same analysis showed that the
reductions in the duration of trial that did occur were not due to
procedural reforms, but rather resulted from increases in court

18

Id. at 488.
Id. at 494.
20
Id. at 495.
21
Gailbraith, supra note 10, at 83.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Langer & Doherty, supra note 10.
26
Id. at 252.
27
Id. at 251.
19
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capacity and plea-bargaining. 28 Thus, the report showed that “the
procedural reforms that aimed to shorten procedure had the opposite
effect: lengthening both pre-trial and trial.”29
Many of these observations imply concrete ways to improve
international courts with strategies that eliminate unnecessary delays.
It is important to note that delays caused by witness protection are
not listed above, and this article will argue that they are in a category
of their own. Unlike delays caused by inefficient procedures or lack
of cooperation among the parties and participants, delays concerning
the protection of individuals involved with court proceedings are not
properly handled with impatience or haste. These types of delays are
necessary for the fairness of trials and the optimal functioning of the
court system. Discounting the safety and security of witnesses will
not necessarily assist courts in overcoming criticism about their slow
pace, especially when there are many other causes of delays that are
unrelated to witness protection.
B. Cases
1. Haradinaj

Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj are
accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to
commit crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and
customs of war as members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),
which persecuted and abducted Serbian, Kosovar Roma/Egyptian,
and Kosavar Albanian citizens. 30 Collectively, the allegations
against all three include harassment, deportation or forcible transfers
of civilians, cruel treatment, murder, rape, and torture. 31 Haradinaj
was allegedly the de facto commander of the KLA. 32 Balaj was
allegedly a member of the KLA and the commander of a special unit


28

Id. at 259.
Id. at 243.
30
Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT04-84-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 3 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Haradinaj et al.
Appeal Judgment].
31
See ICTY website, Case Information Sheet for Haradinaj et al., available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/cis/en/cis_haradinaj_al_en.pdf.
32
Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 2.
29
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called the Black Eagles. 33 Lahi was allegedly a deputy commander
and finance director for the KLA. 34
The Haradinaj trial commenced at the ICTY on March 5,
2007, and the Trial Chamber’s judgment was delivered on April 3,
2008. 35 The Trial Chamber found insufficient evidence for the
charge of JCE among the three defendants. All of the defendants
were acquitted of the various charges, with the exception of
Brahimaj, who was found guilty of torture. 36 The prosecution filed
an appeal on May 2, 2008, claiming that the Trial Chamber abused
its discretion by violating the prosecution’s right to a fair trial by
dismissing its requests for more time to obtain the testimony of a
witness reluctant to testify because of alleged intimidation. 37 The
appeals decision was delivered on July 21, 2010, in which a partial
re-trial was ordered for all defendants concerning the charges of
JCE. 38
2. Lubanga

Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is on trial at the ICC for war crimes,
specifically enlisting and conscripting child soldiers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Lubanga is allegedly the
founder and former President of the Union des Patriotes
Congolais (UPC), as well as the founder and former commander-inchief of the UPC’s military branch, the Forces patriotiques pour la
libération du Congo (FPLC). 39 The UPC/FPLC is described as a
hierarchically-organized, armed group participating in the ongoing
hostilities
in
the
DRC. 40
Lubanga’s trial began on January 26, 2009. 41 The stay of the
proceedings discussed in this article occurred on July 8, 2010, and

33

Id.
Id.
35
See ICTY website, supra note 31.
36
Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 481.
37
Id. ¶¶ 14, 17.
38
Id. ¶ 50.
39
See ICC website, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases
/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/demo
cratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.
40
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/01-04/06, ¶¶ 3–4
(Apr. 3, 2006).
41
See ICC website, supra note 39.
34
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the appeals decision on the stay of proceedings was delivered on
October 8, 2010. 42
III. PART ONE: PROTECTION DILEMMAS IN HARADINAJ AND LUBANGA
A. Dissection of the Dilemmas Encountered by the Haradinaj and
Lubanga Courts

The trial chambers of the ICTY and the ICC were in the same
no-win situation when faced with dilemmas concerning the
protection of individuals involved with their courts. They were
forced to choose between an expeditious trial that compromised the
needs of witnesses involved in the trial and a delayed trial that
accommodated these individual needs. Both trial chambers chose to
expedite proceedings, a choice that was dismissive of the security
concerns of those involved in the trials.
In Haradinaj, two witnesses refused to testify before the
Trial Chamber, citing intimidation and fear in relation to testifying. 43
The prosecution claimed that these witnesses possessed crucial
information concerning the accused and that it needed more time to
secure their testimony. 44
The Trial Chamber denied the
prosecution’s requests for more time extensions, noting that the
prosecution had already exceeded its time limit for the presentation
of its case. 45 The prosecution later argued that the Trial Chamber
“rewarded witness intimidation” and prohibited a fair trial by
refusing to allow for more time in order to secure the testimony of
these witnesses and for not taking steps to facilitate or compel their
testimony. 46 Further, the prosecution argued that the absence of
these two witnesses’ testimonies resulted in the acquittals of the

42

The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2582,
Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I
of 8 July 2010 Entitled, “Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for
Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or
Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU”
(Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor].
43
The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No.
IT-04-84-A 540-483, Prosecution Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 3
(July 17, 2008).
44
Id. ¶ 5.
45
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
46
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
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accused. 47 The prosecution criticized the Trial Chamber for
choosing an expeditious trial over a fair one. 48
Similarly, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga made a choice
between two problematic options with regard to the disclosure of the
identity of a person affiliated with the prosecution, referred to as
Intermediary 143. Intermediaries are individuals affiliated with the
prosecution who work in the field to assist alleged child soldiers in
filling out victim application materials and who introduce these
children to prosecution investigators. 49 The defense insisted that the
disclosure of the identity of Intermediary 143 was essential for the
examination of a witness in the defense’s abuse of process claim. 50
This abuse of process claim involved the accusation that
intermediaries, in collaboration with the prosecution, coached
witnesses to provide false testimony. 51
The prosecution opposed the disclosure of Intermediary
143’s identity for several reasons. 52 The prosecution argued that,
from a policy perspective, disclosure would inhibit the prosecution’s
ability to effectively gather information from dangerous locations if
it could not guarantee the protection of the identities of
intermediaries. 53 The prosecution also emphasized that disclosure
would negatively impact the Intermediary’s career and professional
credibility because of the nature of the defense team’s allegations. 54
Most importantly, the prosecution argued that the safety and security
of Intermediary 143 would be at risk if his identity was revealed, in
part due to the type of allegations and also because “living where
they live…[intermediaries] are at real, documented risk on account

47

Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 3.
49
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ¶ 15 (May 31, 2010).
50
Id. ¶ 143.
51
Id. ¶ 25, quoting Defense Counsel Maitre Mabille: “The Defence also intend to
show that some of this false testimony was fabricated with the assistance of
intermediaries who collaborated with the Office of the Prosecutor” (Transcript of
Hearing on 27 January 2010, at 20–22, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-236-CONF-ENG ET (Jan. 27, 2010)); see also
Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶ 4.
52
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ¶¶ 58, 62, 66 (May 31, 2010).
53
Id.
54
Id.
48
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of the activities they undertake for the OTP [Office of the
Prosecutor] and for other organs of the Court.” 55
Seemingly in agreement with the prosecution’s assessment of
the risks associated with revealing the intermediary’s identity, the
Trial Chamber initially ordered that the disclosure occur only after
protection measures were implemented. 56 The Chamber reiterated
its requirement that protective measures be put in place prior to
disclosure in its rejection of the prosecution’s request to appeal the
disclosure of Intermediary 143:
[A] court will strive not to treat individuals who are
affected by the work of the Court unfairly (as
demonstrated by the Chamber’s insistence that the
necessary protective measures are implemented prior
to disclosure of intermediary 143’s identity) . . . the
Chamber recognizes that in certain circumstances, the
treatment of particular individuals (e.g. the accused,
victims or witnesses) may have a significant impact
on the overall fairness of the proceedings. 57
When the Trial Chamber discovered that the implementation of these
protection measures would require a time delay, however, the Trial
Chamber chose to order the disclosure to a more limited group of
defense team members rather than to await the implementation of the
protection measures. 58
The Trial Chamber thus revealed its priority to keep the
proceedings running without delay, even though the prosecution,
consistent with its earlier position, insisted that Intermediary 143
must be protected by the Court before his identity was revealed.59

55

Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 139(d) (“Disclosure of the identity of the intermediary . . . is not to be
effected until there has been an assessment by the VWU, and any protective
measures that are necessary have been put in place.”).
57
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2463,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on
Intermediaries,” ¶ 30 (June 4, 2010).
58
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2517Red, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the
Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU (July 8, 2010)
[hereinafter Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request].
59
Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
56
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The prosecution in Lubanga held this position in spite of the
repeated orders of disclosure by the Trial Chamber. 60
The
prosecution’s noncompliance with these orders caused the Trial
Chamber to issue a stay of the Lubanga trial. 61
B. The No-Win Nature of these Dilemmas

The Haradinaj and Lubanga courts had two options. The
first option was to delay the respective trials in order to cater to the
needs of at-risk individuals, ensuring their safety in spite of the loss
of time. The second option was to continue with the proceedings,
given that the length of time required for the resolution of the
concerned individuals’ problems was uncertain, and the trials could
be stalled for an unknown period of time.
If judges chose to delay proceedings, they would cause
several unfavorable results. First, delaying the proceedings would
likely lengthen the overall trial, resulting in additional operating
costs. Second, delays potentially infringe upon the accused’s right to
an expeditious trial. Third, if delaying the proceedings would be
perceived as elective or voluntary, doing so may exacerbate criticism
that international criminal proceedings are unnecessarily lengthy,
which could reduce public support for international tribunals. 62
This article argues that the second possible course of action,
expediting proceedings, would have even greater consequences. If a
chamber refused a time extension for the implementation of
protective measures, it could cause a frightened witness to refuse to
testify. The absence of witness testimony could prevent a critical
component of a party’s case, and the party would, therefore, have
ammunition for an appeal. Ironically, an appeal of this type could
lengthen the proceedings more than the delay at issue.
Another danger resulting from expediting the proceedings in
the context of witness protection is that other witnesses may be
deterred from cooperating with courts if they believe they will not be
adequately protected. A third possible consequence is that deficient
protective measures could put the lives and safety of witnesses and
their families at risk. If a witness were harmed as a result of

60

Id. ¶¶ 12–13.
Id. ¶ 31.
62
See Heinsch, supra note 13, at 481.
61
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testifying, a court would lose credibility in its claim to provide for
and prioritize its witnesses’ security.
C. The Legal Basis for the Trial Chambers’ Actions
1. General authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial

Article 20(1) of the Statute of the ICTY states that “The Trial
Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure
and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” 63 Nearly
identical is Article 64 of the ICC’s Rome Statute: “The Trial
Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” 64
ICTY Statute Article 20(1) and the Rome Statute Article
64(2) establish the trial chamber as the authority in determining what
constitutes a fair trial and whether parties are in compliance with the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This mandate grants trial
chambers a huge amount of discretionary power. These provisions
also require that a trial chamber ensure fairness, expeditiousness,
respect for the rights of the accused, and regard for the protection of
victims and witnesses. In essence, a trial chamber has the difficult
task of balancing the competing interests of parties or participants.
2. Authority over matters of protection

With regard to the protection of victims and witnesses, both
the ICTY and the ICC grant the trial chambers ultimate authority
over these decisions. The following two sections will explain the
different statutory bases for the authority of the ICC and ICTY trial
chambers.
i)

ICC

At the ICC, discretionary authority over the protection of
victims and witnesses is enshrined in the Rome Statute and the Rules

63

Updated Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 20(1), Sept. 2009 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
64
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(2).
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of Procedure and Evidence. Article 64 of the Rome Statute states
that: “The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the
accused and due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses.” 65 Thus, according to the Rome Statute, the Trial
Chamber has both the privilege and the burden to maintain the
fairness and expeditiousness of the trial. Additionally, the Trial
Chamber has responsibility for the welfare of the accused, the
witnesses, and the victims, as its decisions have an impact on these
parties.
Rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC
also enables the Trial Chamber to “order measures to protect a
victim, a witness or another person at risk on account of testimony
given by a witness . . . . ” 66 Interestingly, Rule 84 enables the Trial
Chamber to order disclosures, 67 and Rule 81 foresees that such
disclosures may be the cause of enhanced risk to a participant in the
proceedings, as it states: “When the disclosure of such information
may create a risk to the safety of the witness, the Court shall take
measures to inform the witness in advance.”68 The Rome Statute,
therefore, provides for situations when disclosures that negatively
affect a witness’s safety become necessary.
The Trial Chamber is further tasked with remedying the
detrimental impact on victim and witness safety as it sees fit. Part 4
of Rule 81 states: “The Chamber dealing with the matter shall, on its
own motion or at the request of the Prosecutor, the accused or any
State, take the necessary steps to . . . protect the safety of witnesses
and victims and members of their families.” 69 Because it is the
entity tasked with making decisions concerning protection, the
security of witnesses, victims, and others at risk due to testimony is
the Trial Chamber’s responsibility. If the Trial Chamber should
make poor decisions or orders in this regard, the parties may bring

65

Id.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 87, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part. II-A) (Sept. 9,
2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
67
Id. r. 84 (“The Trial Chamber shall…make any necessary orders for the
disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed and for the
production of additional evidence. To avoid delay and to ensure that the trial
commences on the set date, any such orders shall include strict time limits which
shall be kept under review by the Trial Chamber.”).
68
Id. r. 81(3).
69
Id. r. 81(4).
66
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the issue up to the appeals chamber to remedy the damage done,
either during proceedings, in the form of interlocutory appeals, or
after a decision is rendered. Interlocutory appeals, however, are
subject to certain conditions, which are explained in detail in section
III(d).
Although the Trial Chamber has the discretion to decide
matters of witness protection on its own, other parties, participants,
and organs of the Court may make suggestions, provide advice, and
appeal the Trial Chamber’s decisions. 70 The Victims and Witnesses
Unit (VWU) participates in precisely this manner. Specifically, the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence foresee that the Chamber will
consult the VWU regarding protective measures:
Upon the motion of the Prosecutor or the defence or
upon the request of a witness or a victim or his or her
legal representative, if any, or on its own motion, and
after having consulted with the Victims and Witnesses
Unit, as appropriate, a Chamber may order measures
to protect a victim, a witness or another person at risk
on account of testimony given by a witness . . . . 71
[emphasis added].
Article 43(6) of the Rome Statute also specifically recognizes the
intertwined role of the prosecution in matters of witness protection;
it states that the VWU, in consultation with the prosecution, will
provide protective measures, security arrangements, and other types
of support for victims, witnesses, and other individuals who are at
risk on account of witness testimony. 72

70

See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68(4) (“The Victims and Witnesses Unit
may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate protective measures,
security arrangements, counseling and assistance….”); see also ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 81(4) (“The Chamber dealing with the
matter shall, on its own motion or at the request of the Prosecutor, the accused or
any State, take the necessary steps to…protect the safety of witnesses and victims
and members of their families…”).
71
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 87(1).
72
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 43(6): “The Registrar shall set up a Victims and
Witnesses Unit within the Registry. This Unit shall provide, in consultation with
the Office of the Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements,
counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear
before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such
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Further, the VWU is the expert entity that advises the Court
on the above-referenced protective and supportive measures 73 and
recommends the adoption of particular protective measures. 74 The
VWU’s mandate requires that it be an impartial service provider,75
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence further provide for the
VWU to employ experts in witness protection and security. 76 Given
its neutrality and expertise, the VWU is the appropriate entity to
assess an individual’s risk in the event any questions or debate arise.
ii) ICTY

Like the ICC, trial chambers at the ICTY have discretionary
authority over the protection of individuals involved with the court.
Rule 69(A) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that:
“In exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor may apply to a Judge
or Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity of a
victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person
is brought under the protection of the Tribunal.” 77 A failure to
comply with disclosure obligations results in sanctions. 78
Rule 75 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence grants the
Trial Chamber the right to order protective measures for victims and
witnesses on its own initiative or at the request of a party or the
individual concerned. 79 Furthermore, the ICTY’s Rule 75 details the
measures possible for the protection of victims and witnesses while
emphasizing the Trial Chamber’s exclusive control over such
measures. 80 However, Rule 69(B) provides that in determining
protective measures, the Trial Chamber “may consult the Victims

witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including trauma
related to crimes of sexual violence.”
73
Id. art. 68(4).
74
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 17(2)(a)(ii).
75
Id. r. 18(b).
76
Id. r. 19(a).
77
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 69(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44
(Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
78
Id. r. 68 bis.
79
Id. r. 75(A) (“A Judge or a Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of
either party, or of the victim or witness concerned, or of the Victims and Witnesses
Section, order appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of victims and
witnesses, provided that the measures are consistent with the rights of the
accused.”).
80
Id. r. 75(B–K).
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and Witnesses Section” [emphasis added]. 81 Additionally, Rule 34
specifically notes that the Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) has
the ability to recommend particular protective measures to the Trial
Chamber on behalf of victims and witnesses. 82 Thus, the ICTY
Rules are clear that there is no requirement to consult with the VWS.
The VWS, therefore, plays an advisory role in informing the Trial
Chamber’s orders concerning victim and witness protection.
Noteworthy is the fact that neither the ICTY nor the ICC
statutes or rules provide for any other entity to make final
determinations concerning the fairness of the proceedings or the
measures appropriate for protecting participants in the proceedings.
The Trial Chamber, therefore, has the discretionary authority to
make any and all decisions in these areas, subject only to the check
of the Appeals Chamber. 83 The Trial Chamber, however, may
always seek opinions from the parties, participants, and VWU/VWS
regarding matters of protection.
D. The Failed Applications for Interlocutory Appeals

According to ICC Rule 155(1), parties or participants may
lodge an interlocutory appeal at any point during the proceedings,
subject to the approval of an application submitted to the trial
chamber. 84 In order to grant leave to appeal, however, the Trial
Chamber must find that the issue meets several criteria, one of which
is that the issue affects the fairness and expediency of the

81

Id. r. 69(B).
Id. r. 34(A)(i).
83
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 82(1)(d) (“Either party may appeal . . . a
decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and
expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which,
in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the
Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings.”); see also ICTY
Statute, supra note 63, art. 25 (“(1) The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from
persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following
grounds: (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or (b) an error
of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. (2) The Appeals Chamber
may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers.”).
84
See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r.155(1) (“When a
party wishes to appeal a decision under article 82, paragraph 1(d), or article 82,
paragraph 2, that party shall, within five days of being notified of that decision,
make a written application to the Chamber that gave the decision, setting out the
reasons for the request for leave to appeal.”).
82
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proceedings or the outcome of the trial. 85 Only if the application for
leave to appeal is granted will the appeals chamber hear the issue.86
At the ICTY, an interlocutory appeal is permitted by Rule 73(B), the
requirements of which are identical to those of the ICC Rule
155(1). 87 Like the ICC Trial Chambers, the ICTY Trial Chambers
must approve applications for interlocutory appeals. 88
The Lubanga Trial Chamber assessed an application for an
interlocutory appeal on June 4, 2010, when the prosecution applied
for leave to appeal the disclosure order regarding Intermediary 143.89
Among other arguments, the prosecution contended that the fairness
of the trial would be compromised because disclosure would
“critically impact[] . . . the Prosecution’s ability to fulfill its duties
with regard to protection.” 90 Concerning the effect on the outcome
of the trial, the prosecution argued that “because the Decision
negates the usefulness of Intermediary 143, and because it will have
consequences on the recruitment of other intermediaries, this will
impair the prosecution’s ability to call relevant evidence, and as a
result it will have a direct impact on the outcome of the trial.” 91 The
Trial Chamber rejected the prosecution’s arguments and held that the
order of disclosure neither impacted the fairness or expediency of the


85

See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168,
Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial
Chamber I’s 3 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ¶¶ 9–14 (July 13,
2006).
86
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 155(1); ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 77, r. 73(B).
87
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 77, at r. 73(B) (“Decisions
on all motions are without interlocutory appeal save with certification by the Trial
Chamber, which may grant such certification if the decision involves an issue that
would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or
the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, an
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the
proceedings.”).
88
Id.
89
See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/062463, Decision on the Prosecution Request for leave to Appeal the Decision on
Intermediaries, ¶¶ 2, 7, 35 (June 2, 2010).
90
Id. ¶ 11, quoting Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent
Request, supra note 58, ¶ 33.
91
Id. ¶ 20.
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proceedings nor affected the outcome of the trial.92 Thus, the
prosecution was not able to argue its position regarding Intermediary
143 at the appeals level.
Similarly, the prosecution in Haradinaj applied for leave to
appeal the Trial Chamber’s decisions that denied extensions of time
to obtain the testimony of a key witness. 93 The Trial Chamber also
rejected this application on the grounds that it did not meet the
criteria for an interlocutory appeal. The Trial Chamber found that
the denial of time extensions was not outcome-determinative
because the prosecution had failed to show that the key witness,
Shefqet Kabashi, was likely to testify if the extensions were
granted. 94 Having been silenced by the Trial Chamber, the
prosecution never had the chance to present its arguments regarding
the extensions and this witness before the Appeals Chamber.
Both trial chambers determined that the respective issues in
Lubanga and Haradinaj would not affect the outcome of the trials;
the opposite came true, however. In Lubanga, the unsettled issue of
the disclosure of Intermediary 143 resulted in actions by both the
prosecution and the Trial Chamber that threatened to terminate the
proceedings. In Haradinaj, the Appeals Chamber found that the
absence of witness testimony could have affected the outcome of the
case. These instances indicate that the merits of appeal applications
are difficult for a trial chamber to accurately assess. This task
presents a conflict of interest for the trial chamber because the trial
chamber must assess its own decisions. To expect a trial chamber to
do so impartially is perhaps unrealistic. In reviewing applications to
appeal, a trial chamber is forced to decide between two options. The
first is to justify the trial chamber’s own actions by categorizing the
issues presented as non-outcome determinative and not having a
great impact on the fairness or expediency of trial. The second
alternative is for the trial chamber to admit a potential error and
possibly delay the trial pending the issue’s resolution. Given the
pressure on international tribunals to be efficient and also to bolster
the public’s perception of their credibility and legitimacy, 95 one

92

Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT04-84-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Certification to Appeal the
Trial Chamber’s Decision Concerning Shefqet Kabashi, ¶ 4 (Dec. 5, 2007).
93
Id. ¶ 1.
94
Id. ¶ 3.
95
International tribunals face a variety of criticisms, including that they do not
have a legitimate legal basis, are political tools for conducting witch hunts, and
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could imagine that trial chamber judges may confront questions of
their authority with a variety of motivations, including, among
others, the desire to appear consistent, principled, and decisive.
Although these are noble goals, they may result in judges being
biased in favor of their own decisions.
A policy that could prevent similar problems in the future for
both the ICC and the ICTY is to lower the standard for interlocutory
appeals.
Rather than requiring that an issue be outcomedeterminative or greatly impacting upon the fairness or expediency
of the proceedings, the issue could be characterized as one that may
be outcome-determinative or would affect the fairness and
expediency of a trial to a considerable degree. If trial chambers
used this standard, appeals chambers would be more likely to assess
problematic issues at an earlier stage, as more applications for appeal
would likely be successful. 96 There is a great advantage to an
appeals chamber assessing the issues for which the parties seek an
appeal, as opposed to the trial chamber silencing them by rejecting
appeals applications. An appeals chamber is separated from the dayto-day proceedings of the trial and, therefore, may be less susceptible
to the above-noted biases and pressures that a trial chamber faces.
An appeals chamber, not the trial chamber, is the most appropriate
decision-maker for particularly sensitive issues like the ones
addressed in this article.
If the interlocutory appeal application had been granted, the
Lubanga prosecution would have been able to fully plead its case
regarding Intermediary 143. In the prosecution’s later appeal of the
Trial Chamber’s decision to stay the proceedings, it argued that what
the Trial Chamber characterized as “non-compliance” was simply a

have neo-colonialist motives. See, e.g., Stephen Asiimwe, ICC is another colonial
hangover,
NewVision
Website,
Jun.
29,
2011,
available
at
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/459/758825 (calling the ICC a “new jacket for
colonial hangover”); John Perazzo, International Kangaroo Court,
Frontpagemag.com, July 30, 2003, available at http://archive.frontpagem
ag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=17001 (arguing that the ICC would “likely be
used as a political and public relations battering ram…”).
96
When a Trial Chamber’s own decision is contested by way of an interlocutory
appeal application, the danger for bias on the part of the Trial Chamber is great.
Another possible remedy for this apparent conflict of interest is to allow the
Appeals Chamber, rather than the Trial Chamber, to assess applications for
interlocutory appeals. This method is sensible, at the very least, when the issue of
appeal focuses on the Trial Chamber’s orders or conduct.
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disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s disclosure orders. 97 Further,
the prosecution argued that it had been denied the proper opportunity
to object. 98 Had the prosecution settled the issue with the Appeals
Chamber, it would not have been able to justify its non-compliance
with the Trial Chamber’s orders. Without such justification for noncompliance, the prosecution would, presumably, not have disobeyed
the Trial Chamber’s orders, and the proceedings would not have
been stayed. Similarly, assuming that the Appeals Chamber would
have reached the same decision in Haradinaj during the trial as it did
after the trial concluded, much time could have been saved, as a retrial would not likely have become necessary.
The Trial Chambers’ denial of the interlocutory appeals was
ostensibly linked to their desire to move forward with the
proceedings without unnecessary detours. Ironically, granting the
interlocutory appeals in these instances could have shortened the
proceedings in both Lubanga and Haradinaj in comparison to what
actually unfolded.
IV. PART TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRIAL CHAMBERS’ DISCRETION
A. Analysis of the Protection Issues
1. Lubanga

Following the rejection of its application for leave to appeal
the disclosure order, the Lubanga prosecution lodged a series of
requests for time extensions concerning disclosure. 99 The Trial
Chamber refused to grant any extensions, as it viewed the issue as
already resolved. 100 This conclusion was in spite of the fact that the

97

The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2544Red, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s
decision of 8 July 2010 to stay the proceedings for abuse of process (July 30,
2010).
98
Id.
99
Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶¶ 9-13.
100
Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note
58, ¶ 10 (“In our judgment the proposal outlined by the Chamber, which as I have
said we understood to be acceptable to the Defence, namely that disclosure should
be limited to those in Court today and the Defence resource person with no
investigative steps being taken until a further order was issued by the Chamber,
does not materially undermine the position of 143, or in any way enhance any risk
that may exist for him . . . In those circumstances we do not consider that there is
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order to disclose had been significantly altered to require disclosure
before protective measures could be put in place, albeit to a limited
group of people for limited purposes. 101 Instead, the Trial Chamber
ordered immediate disclosure to the defense team, including a
defense resource person, and required the disclosure to be limited to
the questioning of a defense witness and not to be used for
investigative purposes. 102
The prosecution objected to the limited disclosure for several
reasons. First, the prosecution alleged that the defense resource
person was not trustworthy. 103 Second, the prosecution argued that
the intermediary’s safety would be at risk if his identity was
disclosed prior to the implementation of the protective measures, 104 a
point for which the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) did not
provide contemporaneous input and only later disagreed.105
Without a full analysis of the serious issues concerning
Intermediary 143 and the potential repercussions of disclosure, the
Trial Chamber pushed the proceedings forward by ordering a limited
disclosure twice on July 7, 2010. 106 The Chamber justified this
course of action for several reasons. First, the Chamber implied that
since protective measures had been offered, though rejected, by the
Intermediary, the Court had fulfilled its obligation to protect the
Intermediary. 107 Second, the Chamber dismissed the prosecution’s
concern that one of the members of the defense team was of

any potential increased risk to 143 and, [ . . . ] we do not consider it necessary to
suspend that order pending any application that may be made by the Prosecution
for leave to appeal. It would, in our view, only be necessary to suspend that order
if there was a risk that it would enhance or increase the security risk for 143.”).
101
Id.
102
Id. ¶ 19.
103
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2544Red, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s
decision of 8 July 2010 to Stay the Proceedings for Abuse of Process, ¶ 3 (July 30,
2010) (“The resource person was allegedly one of the top members of Lubanga’s
militia. He is in DRC and some defence witnesses made allegations that he
attempted to taint evidence.”).
104
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2515, Prosecution's Urgent Request
for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or
Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with VWU, at 7 ¶
2 (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Lubanga Prosecution’s Urgent Request].
105
Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note
58, ¶¶ 14, 17.
106
Id. ¶¶ 9–16.
107
Id.
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questionable integrity because “no conclusion adverse to that
individual [] has been drawn by anyone in a responsible position in
this Court.” 108
Third, even though the Trial Chamber had changed the
timing of the disclosure (requiring that it occur prior to the
implementation of protective measures), the Trial Chamber opined
that the limited nature of the disclosure ensured that the security risk
of the Intermediary would not increase. 109
In making this
unwarranted assumption about risk, the Trial Chamber declined to
utilize the expertise of the VWU. Further, the Trial Chamber
eliminated the possibility for the prosecution to appeal the decision
and stated the following:
We do not consider it necessary to suspend th[e] order
[to disclose the identity of Intermediary 143] pending
any application that may be made by the Prosecution
for leave to appeal. It would, in our view, only be
necessary to suspend that order if there were a risk
that it would enhance or increase the security risk for
143. 110
The Chamber’s orders for a limited disclosure of Intermediary 143’s
identity were, in its own opinion, sufficient to ensure the safety of
the Intermediary. This determination was, however, not based upon
any evidence or consultations with the VWU regarding the
alterations to the disclosure’s parameters and timing. Rather, the
Trial Chamber independently made the determination about what
was necessary for Intermediary 143’s protection. Technically, the
Trial Chamber possesses the discretion to do so. 111
The Trial Chamber did not contact the VWU regarding an
updated security assessment for Intermediary 143 until July 8, 2010.

108

Id.
Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note
58, ¶ 12 (“[T]he limited disclosure that we have ordered, in our judgment, has the
result of ensuring that there is no deterioration in the security position of that
individual.”), quoting the Trial Chamber’s Second Ruling, delivered on July 7,
2010.
110
Id. ¶ 10, quoting Transcript of Hearing on 7 July 2010, at p. 9, line 20, to p. 13,
line 25, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/062517-Red, ¶ 13 (July 7, 2010).
111
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(2).
109
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The Chamber’s consultation of the VWU was prompted by the
prosecution’s submission: “Prosecution’s Urgent Request for
Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary
143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further
Consultations with the VWU.” In this submission, the prosecution
claimed it would “consult with the VWU as to whether the security
situation allows for disclosure now” and needed to “know whether
there is any need to implement urgent interim measures prior to
disclosure.” 112
When the Trial Chamber subsequently contacted the VWU,
the VWU stated that it had understood the Trial Chamber’s order to
include a requirement to notify Intermediary 143 of the disclosure
order and to discuss interim measures. 113 The VWU also informed
the Trial Chamber that the limited disclosure of Intermediary 143’s
identity would not present a security risk, directly contradicting the
assertions of the prosecution in its earlier submission. 114 In response
to this incongruity, the Trial Chamber stated: “there is reason to
doubt the accuracy and reliability of [the prosecution’s]
submission.” 115 The Trial Chamber ignored the prosecution’s pleas
to revisit the security issue and, following the prosecution’s noncompliance with the two orders of disclosure on July 7, 2010, the
Trial Chamber stayed the proceedings. 116
The timing of the Trial Chamber’s consultation of the VWU
was backwards, as it was only after the prosecution refused to
comply with the limited disclosure orders that the Trial Chamber
explored whether such orders would increase the risk to Intermediary
143, given his unprotected status. Thus, the VWU was consulted
amidst the power struggle between the Trial Chamber and the
prosecution. At best, the VWU was able to make an on-the-spot
determination of the effect of a limited disclosure on a person
granted protective measures that had not yet been implemented. At
worst, the VWU did not have the time to thoroughly investigate the
concerns of the prosecution and Intermediary 143 prior to its
endorsement of the Trial Chamber’s orders.

112

Lubanga Prosecution's Urgent Request, supra note 104, quoted in Lubanga
Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note 58, ¶ 14.
113
Id. ¶ 13.
114
Id. ¶ 17.
115
Id. ¶ 14.
116
Id. ¶ 31.
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In either event, the VWU should have been consulted prior to
ordering disclosure if there was a disagreement concerning an
individual’s security. Not doing so reflected a lack of concern for
the protection of those involved with the court. Without providing
assurances to witnesses that their safety is of utmost importance, the
legitimacy and feasibility of the proceedings are jeopardized. The
Trial Chamber, however, had a different priority; it stated that “given
the attitude now demonstrated by 143, there is an appreciable risk
that implementation will be delayed significantly,” and it refused to
accommodate the witness’s situation. 117 Rather than focusing on the
needs of Intermediary 143, the Trial Chamber was preoccupied with
preventing delays of the trial.
2. Haradinaj

By rejecting the prosecution’s requests for extensions and its
application for leave to appeal, the Trial Chamber in Haradinaj
closed the prosecution’s case and proceeded with the defense’s
case. 118 The prosecution, therefore, was unable to obtain the
testimony of two key witnesses, which, it claimed, resulted in the
acquittals of the defendants. 119 In its appeal of these acquittals, the
prosecution argued that it had been deprived of a fair trial, a right
guaranteed by Article 20(1). 120
Article 20(1) states: “The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in
accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full
respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection
of victims and witnesses.” 121 The prosecution argued that, according
to 20(1), a chamber must ensure that neither party has a disadvantage
in presenting its case and that the Trial Chamber failed in its duty to
maintain a fair trial. 122 The prosecution’s appeal specifically
identified two errors of the Trial Chamber. First, the Trial Chamber
refused the prosecution’s requests to take “reasonable measures” to

117

Id. ¶ 12.
The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No.
IT-04-84-A A540-A483, Prosecution Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 4
(July 17, 2008) [hereinafter Haradinaj et al. Prosecution Appeal Brief].
119
Id.
120
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
121
ICTY Statute, supra note 63.
122
Haradinaj et al. Prosecution Appeal Brief, supra note 118, ¶¶ 6–7.
118
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obtain the testimony of the witnesses. 123 Second, the Trial Chamber
did not exercise its own powers to elicit this evidence. 124
B. How the Trial Chambers Advanced Goals of International Criminal
Trials
1. General remarks

“Swift justice is more certain justice,” stated Alex Whiting in
his analysis of expediency in international criminal trials. 125 “If
present and future leaders and commanders see that war criminals
are brought to justice quickly (and of course effectively), they will
be more likely to conform their behavior to the laws of war and to
adopt policies and promote training to ensure that these rules are
followed.” 126 Thus, preventing excessive or unnecessary delays is
important in order to promote deterrence.
Efficient management of the proceedings is also important in
terms of fairness to both the accused and the victims. For victims,
speedy justice can reduce disillusionment and promote cooperation
with the court. 127 Also, fast proceedings help in terms of the
preservation of evidence. 128 When trials are completed quickly, the
accused’s right to an expeditious trial, enshrined in the Rome Statute
and ICTY Statute, is respected. 129 Whiting also cites the possibility
that the international community, with its short attention span, will
move on to other crises and reduce their cooperation if proceedings
take too long. 130
2. Lubanga

In Lubanga, the prosecution requested a stay of the
proceedings in order to consult with the VWU and to resolve the
protection issues concerning Intermediary 143 before continuing

123

Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
125
Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be
Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 330 (2009).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 333.
128
Id. at 332-33.
129
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(2); ICTY Statute, supra note 63, art.
20(1).
130
See Whiting, supra note 125, at 333–34.
124
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with the trial. By refusing this request and insisting upon the limited
disclosure, as the Trial Chamber did, the Court stood to gain several
things. First, it prevented the inevitable delay that would result if
Intermediary 143 were permitted to negotiate a satisfactory
protection agreement, a process which could be extended and
protracted. Additionally, if the Court catered to Intermediary 143’s
dissatisfaction with the protection package already offered by the
VWU, the Court would be acknowledging that such packages are
negotiable. By empowering the intermediary to reject the VWU’s
protection plan, the Court may give Intermediary 143 the impression
of being in an advantaged bargaining position. Such a precedent
could be dangerous and unmanageable for the VWU, which has
financial and practical constraints that limit its operations. A witness
could, hypothetically, hold out and refuse to testify in an attempt to
secure a larger financial package or a particular place for relocation,
which could present significant or even unaffordable costs for the
Registry. 131
If witnesses are given this opportunity to manipulate the
system by leveraging their bargaining position, the VWU would be
in a very weak position to overcome the demands of this individual
in order to allow the trial to go on. Therefore, if there is no check on
witnesses involved in protection negotiations with the VWU, the
worst case scenario would be costly in terms of both time and money
for the Court. The Trial Chamber in Lubanga did not allow for this
type of manipulation to occur, possibly sparing the Court from being
put in this disadvantaged position.
3. Haradinaj

In Haradinaj, the main problem in waiting for witnesses’
testimony was that there was no assurance that the witnesses would

131

Protective measures can include both relocation to a different geographical area
and a stipend from the Registry to enable resettlement. See ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 16(4) (providing for “[a]greements on
relocation and provision of support services on the territory of a State of
traumatized or threatened victims, witnesses and others who are at risk on account
of testimony given by such witnesses . . . .”); see also r.17(2)(a)(i) (“The Victims
and Witnesses Unit shall, inter alia, perform the following functions, in
accordance with the Statute and the Rules, and in consultation with the Chamber,
the Prosecutor and the defense, as appropriate: (i) Providing them with adequate
protective and security measures and formulating long- and short-term plans for
their protection.”).
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ever testify; so extensions for them could be futile. In fact, the
prosecution had already tried and failed to obtain these two
witnesses’ testimonies on multiple occasions. 132 One witness,
Shefqet Kabashi, refused to answer questions on two different
occasions, in spite of the fact that the Trial Chamber had already
granted three time extensions, 133 offered the ability to testify via
video-conference link, 134 and issued an Order in Lieu of Indictment
for Contempt against the witness. 135 Notwithstanding these efforts to
facilitate or compel testimony, the witness would not comply. Thus,
the Trial Chamber asserted that, although several witnesses who
were expected to give evidence were never heard, it had “made use
of all of its powers under the Rules to facilitate the reception of
evidence without stepping beyond its role as an impartial arbiter of
facts” in its attempt to acquire this evidence.136
In its rejection of the prosecution’s request for an extension
in order to make further attempts to obtain the testimony of Kabashi,
the Trial Chamber emphasized that the prosecution never argued that
the testimony of Kabashi would be any more likely to materialize if
the prosecution was given more time. 137 Procedurally, the Trial
Chamber had taken significant steps to compel testimony, and these
failed efforts, in combination with the absence of evidence to the
contrary, were a sufficient indication that the witness never intended
to testify, according to the Trial Chamber. 138
In recognition of this witness’s asserted intentions, the Trial
Chamber stated that: “if there were to be a ‘dramatic change’ in
Kabashi’s attitude, which gave cause to believe that he genuinely
intended to testify, then the Chamber would entertain a further

132

The Prosecutor v. Shefqet Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Request for Certification to Appeal the Trial Chamber’s Decision
concerning Shefqet Kabashi, (Dec. 5, 2007).
133
The Prosecutor v. Shefqet Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Appeals Chamber
Decision, ¶ 21 (July 19, 2010).
134
See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 77, r. 81 bis and r.
71(D) (Testifying via video-conference allows a witness to testify from a place
other than the courtroom at the seat of the Court.).
135
Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 27 (Apr. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Haradinaj et al. Judgment].
136
Id. ¶ 28.
137
Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT04-84-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Certification to Appeal the
Trial Chamber’s Decision Concerning Shefqet Kabashi, ¶ 25 (Dec. 5, 2007).
138
Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 25.
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application to receive his testimony.” 139 The defense argued that
“[t]he mere possibility that [Kabashi] might change his mind at some
later stage if he received further legal advice did not warrant a
further adjournment of the Prosecution case.” 140 As there was no
dramatic change in Kabashi’s attitude, the trial proceeded, and
concluded, without his testimony. If Kabashi and the other witness
truly never intended to testify, then the Trial Chamber saved itself
countless weeks of pointless waiting.
4. Concluding remarks

Efficiency in international criminal trials is clearly a
legitimate goal. Courts’ prioritization of efficiency when faced with
situations that could cause delays of an unknown duration is,
therefore, not surprising. The next section will argue, however, that
certain objectives, namely the protection of those involved in court
proceedings, should trump the goal of maximal trial efficiency even
if the length of delays is uncertain.
C. How the Trial Chambers Undermined Goals of International Criminal
Trials
1. General remarks

In a letter to the President of the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Kofi Annan, then the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, wrote the following:
The overriding interest [of the ICC] must be that of
the victims, [sic] and of the international community
as a whole. The court must be an instrument of
justice, not expedience. It must be able to protect the


139

Id., quoting Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj,
Case No. IT-04-84-A, Respondent’s Brief on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj
(confidential), ¶ 39 (Aug. 25, 2008).
140
Id., quoting Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahima,
Case No. IT-04-84-A, Respondent’s Brief on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj
(confidential), ¶ 46 (Aug. 25, 2008).
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weak against the strong. It must demonstrate that an
international conscience is a reality. 141
There are several problems with a court that is viewed as an
‘instrument of expedience.’ Judges may be perceived to be
inattentive to witnesses’ needs, and the court may deter future
witnesses from cooperation. A trial that proceeds at an unforgiving
pace might also appear to be biased and may, as a result, lose respect
and credibility. A trial that moves too rapidly might also prevent the
utilization of witnesses who may not be willing to testify until
significantly after the alleged crimes were committed. 142 Whiting
argues that “time can allow for witnesses to gain perspective on
events in which they participated and to come forward to provide
testimony and evidence. The passage of time, then, can allow for a
more complete and truer accounting of events to emerge.”143
Whiting also states that lengthy trials are often necessary because of
their very nature 144 and that delays can be vital to effective
prosecutions. 145 Whiting’s view is that although the public has
“shown signs of impatience and an increased preference for shorter,
quicker, and narrower cases . . . cases will require a sustained and
long-term commitment from the international community.” 146
The ICC and ICTY Trial Chambers made their priority of
expediency clear by rejecting the prosecution’s requests pertaining to
the protection of individuals involved with the court and by denying
their applications for interlocutory appeals. While expedient
proceedings are often ideal, promoting expediency often involves the
balancing of other priorities, or, as alleged by the prosecution in both
Lubanga and Haradinaj, the sacrifice of the fairness of the trials.
Both prosecution teams claimed that the consequences outweighed
the benefits when it came to expediting the proceedings.

141

Letter from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the
President of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (July 7, 1998).
142
See Whiting, supra note 125, at 354–56 (describing the examples of Milan
Babic and Göran Stoparic, whose truthful and complete testimony took years to
acquire in ICTY proceedings).
143
Id. at 358.
144
Id. at 327.
145
Id. at 363.
146
Id. at 364.
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2. Lubanga

The Lubanga prosecution made several arguments in its
appeal of the Trial Chamber’s stay of the proceedings. 147 The first
argument was that the prosecution’s behavior was not non-compliant
with the Trial Chamber’s orders. 148 The second argument was that
the prosecution shares the responsibility for the protection of
witnesses with the other organs of the Court, and that the Chamber
erred in ruling unilaterally on issues affecting the safety of
Intermediary 143. 149 In sum, the prosecution stated that the
Chamber’s decision reflected a “deep misunderstanding of the legal
positions of the Prosecution, its protection duties under the Statute
and its right to a reasonable opportunity and time to present its
legitimate concerns to the Chamber.” 150
As to the timing of the prosecution’s requests for delays and
reconsideration of the protection issues, the prosecution claimed that
its “insistence to present its views after [the Trial Chamber’s orders]
was wrongly considered to be defiance of the Court’s authority.” 151
The prosecution claimed that it was never afforded the opportunity
to voice its concerns about the safety and security risks that the
disclosure of Intermediary 143’s identity would present. 152
The prosecution emphasized the unfairness of the Trial
Chamber’s “haste” in issuing a “unilateral decision” on a protection
matter, for which the prosecution, the VWU, and the Trial Chamber
share responsibility. 153 The prosecution stated that it has the right to
object to the Trial Chamber’s orders, to seek appellate review of
such orders, and to suggest alternatives, such as withdrawing
evidence, stipulating to particular facts, or amending charges, should

147

The third argument by the prosecution was that the stay of the proceedings was
a disproportionate response to non-compliance, should the prosecution’s actions be
characterized as such. This article will not address the particulars of the third
argument.
148
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecution’s Document in Support
of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s decision of 8 July 2010 to stay the
proceedings for abuse of process, ICC-01/04-01/06-2544-Red, ¶¶ 51–53 (July 30,
2010).
149
Id. ¶¶ 65–69.
150
Id. ¶ 2.
151
Id. ¶ 4.
152
Id. ¶ 3.
153
Id. ¶ 48.
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its objections fail. 154 The prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber
amended its order of disclosure without allowing the prosecution to
present updated information, including confidential material of
which the Trial Chamber may not have been aware. 155 The
prosecution contended that the Trial Chamber “spontaneously and
unilaterally” determined that the amended order posed no increased
risk without consulting the entities with relevant and material
information 156 when the Chamber had a duty to verify that its
assumptions about the safety of Intermediary 143, following a
limited disclosure, were correct.157 Thus, the prosecution claimed
that the Trial Chamber was unreasonably dismissive, resulting in
injustice. 158
The prosecution cited to the Rome Statute, as well as an
Appeals Chamber decision, as justification for its independent
authority to protect witnesses and to support its allegation that the
Trial Chamber “erred by concluding that it has a monopoly of
protective functions.” 159 The prosecution specifically identified the
Rome Statute Articles 68(1), 54(1)(b) and 54(3)(f) as explicitly
involving the prosecution in matters pertaining to witnesses.160
Additionally, the prosecution quoted the Appeals Chamber in
describing the team effort of protecting those at risk: “Consultation,
cooperation and advice are all part of ensuring that individuals are
not put at risk . . . .” 161 Thus, the prosecution’s argument centered

154

Id. ¶ 17(iii).
Id. ¶ 49.
156
Id. ¶ 49.
157
Id. ¶ 53.
158
Id. ¶¶ 49, 57.
159
Id. ¶ 66.
160
Id. ¶ 62. “Article 68(1) states that ‘[t]he Prosecutor shall take such measures
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of [ . . . ] crimes.’ ‘A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.’ The word ‘shall’ in Article 68(1), given its ordinary meaning and the
context in which it is used, underlines that this is a mandatory duty upon the
Prosecutor to take appropriate measures to protect persons interacting with it.
Article 68(1) also specifies that the Prosecution’s duty of protection applies
‘particularly during the investigation and prosecution of [ . . . ] crimes.’ Hence,
there is no doubt that the Prosecution duty to protect persons equally applies
during trial.”
161
Id. ¶ 60.
155
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upon the notion that the Trial Chamber does not have exclusive and
unchecked authority over protection matters.
The prosecution also made several practical points. First, it
stated that the risks presented by the immediate disclosure were not
outweighed by its benefits because the disclosure would not
necessarily expedite the proceedings. Given the fact that the
disclosure prohibited the use of Intermediary 143’s identity for
investigative purposes, the prosecution claimed that it was likely that
143 would be recalled to testify once the prohibition was lifted. 162
Fully implementing protective measures after all barriers were lifted
for the defense would, presumably, be more efficient because it
would allow all of the questioning to occur at once and would
prevent redundant testimony.
Second, the prosecution argued that the short-term delay
resulting from the time required to implement the protective
measures was relatively minor:
[T]he sole issue before the Trial Chamber here was
the potential for a week or two delay in the case,
which in the context of a trial that has already lasted
for 18 months is not significant. Moreover, the harm
to the defence from non-disclosure—the short-term
delay of trial—was insignificant. Indeed, it would
have been abusive to jeopardize a person at risk in
order to avoid a brief delay. 163
Thus, the prosecution believed that the protection of an individual
outweighed the need for expediency in the trial. 164 The Lubanga
prosecution’s concerns, however, fell on deaf ears.
3. Haradinaj

In Haradinaj, the prosecution appealed the Trial Chamber’s
acquittal of the three accused. The prosecution argued that the Trial
Chamber violated the statutory right to a fair trial by refusing the
prosecution’s requests for additional time to obtain the testimony of

162

Id. ¶ 39 (quoting Transcript of Hearing on 7 July 2010, at 12, The Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-312 (July 7, 2010)).
163
Id. ¶ 81.
164
Id.
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the two witnesses who refused to testify because of intimidation and
fear throughout the trial and that this error contributed to the
acquittals. 165 The ICTY prosecution criticized the Trial Chamber’s
“fixation” on speedy proceedings—trading fairness for
expeditiousness. 166 Further, the prosecution argued:
A fair trial is not measured in hours. A fair trial must
be measured by whether or not the Chamber allowed
the parties to present their case. In the case of the
Prosecution, this measurement is to be made on a case
by case basis recognizing that the prosecution
represents the interests of victims, justice and the
international community. 167
The prosecution emphasized that since witness intimidation and fear
permeated the entire trial, the Trial Chamber’s rejection of requests
for additional time were unfair, especially given that the time limit
for the prosecution’s case was set prior to perceiving the extent of
witness intimidation. 168 The prosecution characterized the rush as
the Trial Chamber “over react[ing] to time pressure.” 169 The
prosecution posited, therefore, that the Trial Chamber’s inflexible
enforcement of a 125-hour limit on its case, when it requested an
additional 105 hours, was an abuse of discretion. 170
4. Concluding remarks

The prosecution in both Lubanga and Haradinaj made strong
cases for delaying their respective trials to accommodate special
needs of witnesses. The next section details the responses of the two
Trial Chambers and demonstrates that they disregarded the protests
by the Lubanga and Haradinaj prosecutions.


165

Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶¶ 14–15.
Id.
167
The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No.
IT-04-84-A 540-483, Prosecution Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 21
(July 17, 2008).
168
Id. ¶ 18.
169
Id. ¶ 20.
170
Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
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V. PART THREE: THE APPEALS CHAMBERS’ REMEDIES
A. Haradinaj

The Haradinaj Appeals Chamber took a strong stance against
the Trial Chamber in its agreement with the prosecution’s abuse of
discretion claim. The appeals judgment, therefore, provided clear
guidance regarding the conduct of trial chambers in relation to
balancing expediency with attending to the particular needs of
witnesses.
The Appeals Chamber described the context of the Haradinaj
trial as having an “unprecedented atmosphere of widespread and
serious witness intimidation that surrounded the trial.” 171 The
Appeals Chamber held that such extreme witness intimidation per se
undermines a fair trial, as guaranteed in Article 20(1). 172 Thus, the
Appeals Chamber very clearly prioritized the rights of witnesses to
feel and be protected as a necessary condition to a fair trial. The
Appeals Chamber directly addressed the Trial Chamber’s
discretionary authority to manage trials in order to ensure
expediency, among other things, and it also stressed that the Trial
Chamber must attend to the unique needs of each case.173 It stated
that “what is reasonable in one trial is not automatically reasonable
in another.” 174 This statement has the dual effect of liberalizing the
limit on a party’s presentation of its case while also restricting such
flexibility to cases with circumstances that warrant it. 175 Thus, the
Appeals Chamber simultaneously broadened and limited a trial
chamber’s ability to extend cases beyond its allotted time.
The Appeals Chamber then criticized the Trial Chamber for
its “misplaced priority” in putting “undue emphasis” on time limits,
which reflected its lack of appreciation of the “gravity of the threat

171

Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 35 (“In circumstances of witness intimidation such as this, it is incumbent
upon a Trial Chamber to do its utmost to ensure that a fair trial is possible. Witness
intimidation of the type described by the Trial Chamber undermines the
fundamental objective of the Tribunal, enshrined in Article 20(1).”); see also
ICTY Statute 20(1) (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of
procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”).
173
Id. ¶ 39.
174
Id.
175
Id.
172
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that witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity.”176 The
Appeals Chamber pointed out that the Trial Chamber was on notice
that serious threats were being made to witnesses, but it nevertheless
failed to exercise its powers to ensure the safety of witnesses who
were at risk for “objectively less important logistical
considerations.” 177 The Appeals Chamber, with the exception of
Judge Patrick Robinson, quashed the Trial Chamber’s acquittal of
the three accused and issued a partial re-trial. 178
1. Judge Robinson’s Dissent

As referenced above, the appeals decision was not
unanimous. Judge Robinson disagreed with the Appeals Chamber’s
invalidation of the Trial Chamber’s discretion:
[T]he mere fact that the Appeals Chamber would
have exercised a discretionary power differently is not
a sufficient basis for invalidating the Trial Chamber’s
exercise of that discretion, provided the Trial
Chamber has properly exercised the discretion; a
certain deference must be given to a Trial Chamber in
issues relating to the management of the trial. 179
This deference, Judge Robinson argued, is due because the Trial
Chamber, not the Appeals Chamber, has an “organic familiarity with
the day-to-day conduct of the parties and the practical demands of
the case.” 180
Judge Robinson noted that the Trial Chamber extended the
prosecution’s case three times and left open the possibility for a
fourth extension should the prosecution demonstrate a likelihood that

176

Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 43.
178
Id. ¶ 50.
179
Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30 (Partially Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Patrick Robinson, VI(A) ¶ 2).
180
Id. ¶ 5, quoting Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir et al., Case No. IT-04-80AR73.1, Decision on Radivoje Miletiü’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial
Chamber’s Decision on Joinder of Accused, ¶ 4 (Jan. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. S.
Miloševiü, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the
Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, ¶ 9 (Nov. 1,
2004).
177
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the relevant witness testimony would actually result. 181 Thus,
regarding the issue of granting the prosecution more time, the
Appeals Chamber analyzed whether the Trial Chamber’s actions had
done too little. Judge Robinson criticized this approach and argued
that doing “too little” is a discretionary privilege that is not to be
second-guessed, and the existence of three extensions negated an
abuse of discretion claim in this case. 182 Absent an error that rises to
the level of abuse because it is so unfair or unreasonable, which
Judge Robinson insisted was not present in this case, the Appeals
Chamber may not invalidate the Trial Chamber’s discretion. 183
The obvious point of contention between the Majority and
the Dissent is whether the Trial Chamber’s actions could be
characterized as fair and reasonable. The Majority said that they
were not, given the extenuating circumstances of extreme witness
intimidation and fear. The Dissent stated that it was an impossible
call to make because the Trial Chamber did take some action in the
right direction. The split reflects the difficulty in overturning a trial
chamber’s discretionary decisions and perhaps sheds light on why
the Lubanga Appeals Chamber did not address the issue at all.
B. Lubanga

Although the Lubanga Appeals Chamber ultimately reversed
the stay of proceedings, it did little to clarify how the Trial Chamber
ought to handle protection disagreements in the future. The Appeals
Chamber stated the following:
The Prosecutor commingles arguments against the
Impugned Decision with challenges to the Trial
Chamber’s prior orders . . . [but] neither the first nor
the Second Order of Disclosure is on appeal. The
Appeals Chamber, therefore, does not address the
specific challenges to the First and Second Orders of
Disclosure and restricts its consideration to whether
the Prosecutor refused to comply with the orders of
the Trial Chamber and the propriety of the Trial

181

Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30 (Partially Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Patrick Robinson, VI(A), ¶ 4).
182
Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
183
Id. ¶ 8.
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Chamber’s decision to impose a stay of proceedings
as a consequence. 184
The Appeals Chamber characterized the prosecution’s
actions as deliberate and willful non-compliance, in contrast with the
prosecution’s justification that it was acting within the statutory
framework pursuant to its duty to protect witnesses. 185 Furthermore,
the Appeals Chambers said that the Trial Chamber’s orders must
prevail if there are disagreements in matters relating to protection:
“The Prosecutor (or other parties or participants) must follow the
orders of the Trial Chamber when it comes to issues of
protection.” 186 The prosecution, therefore, does not have an
independent statutory obligation that supersedes the Trial Chamber’s
duty to ensure a fair trial. Rather, “the Trial Chamber, subject only
to the powers of the Appeals Chamber, is the ultimate guardian of a
fair and expeditious trial.” 187
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the second component of
the prosecution’s argument, that the stay of the proceedings was a
disproportionate response to its actions. The Appeals Chamber
decided that the Trial Chamber erred in issuing a stay of the
proceedings without first using sanctions to obtain compliance.
Thus, it was on the proportionality issue that the prosecution
prevailed.
The Appeals Chamber did not address the merit of the Trial
Chamber’s orders because the issue was not ripe. Additionally, it
declined to analyze the legitimacy of the prosecution’s numerous
attempts to protest the orders of the Trial Chamber: “The Appeals
Chamber need not consider whether and to what extent parties may
seek reconsideration of orders of a Trial Chamber or variations of
time limits for consideration of such orders.”188 The Appeals
Chamber, therefore, did not address the cause of the non-compliance
(i.e. whether the Trial Chamber’s independent assessment of the
protection issue and its discretionary order of the limited disclosure
were proper), nor did it advise the Trial Chamber on how to manage
objections to its orders or even whether those objections were

184

Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 46.
186
Id. ¶ 50.
187
Id. ¶ 47.
188
Id. ¶ 48.
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appropriate by the prosecution. While the Appeals Chamber would
have overstepped its bounds had it addressed at great length the
issues arising from the content of the Trial Chamber’s orders,
namely witness protection, it nonetheless could have framed its
decision in a way that would have provided more guidance to the
Trial Chamber and the prosecution.
The Appeals Chamber did make clear, albeit without
elaboration, that when differences of opinion occur regarding
protection, the only opinion that matters is the Trial Chamber’s.
With this assertion, the Appeals Chamber diminished the
significance of witness protection. Since the Trial Chamber can
trump the opinions of the court’s parties and participants, entities
like the VWU and the prosecution are left powerless in the case of
disagreement. The prosecution’s witnesses, and all other individuals
involved in the proceedings, are therefore left without an advocate
and remain defenseless against the authority of the Trial Chamber.
And although the Chamber assumes responsibility for these
witnesses, the Chamber may not have access to the most up-to-date
safety and security information concerning witnesses or individuals
involved in the proceedings. Nor will the Chamber necessarily
possess the requisite expertise to make safety and security judgments
independently, as it did with Intermediary 143. If a trial chamber is
allowed to make discretionary decisions concerning the safety and
security of individuals involved with a court in a unilateral manner,
witnesses and others may be reluctant or afraid to initiate contact
with a court or to continue cooperating with a court if already
involved. As the Appeals Chamber in Haradinaj held, a fair trial is
impossible if witnesses face intimidation or fear. 189
It is important to note that the Appeals Chamber not only
avoided the issue of the underlying cause of the non-compliance, but
it also failed to address the proper role of the VWU and when it
ought to be consulted. Thus, the Appeals Chamber indirectly
condoned the Trial Chamber’s discretionary decision to amend an
order of disclosure without first consulting the VWU. The fact that
the Trial Chamber did consult the VWU at the prosecution’s
prompting indicated that this was a proper step, yet the Appeals
Chamber did not highlight the Trial Chamber’s error in the timing of
this consultation. Thus, the Appeals Chamber overlooked the

189
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recklessness of the Trial Chamber’s unilateral amendment of the
disclosure order.
The Appeals Chamber might have chosen not to address the
above-noted issues in its decision for several reasons. First, the
prosecution did not make any specific allegations that Intermediary
143 had been threatened, nor did it present any documentation that
Intermediary 143 feared for his life and that of his family (at least
not as a matter of public record). Along the same lines, the
accusations against the defense resource person were informal and
unsubstantiated. Thus, the protection issue seemed far more
hypothetical in Lubanga than it was in Haradinaj, where the
witnesses had shown the Court documented instances of
intimidation. Perhaps the Appeals Chamber agreed with the defense
team that the prosecution’s deliberate disobedience was “not because
of insurmountable external obstacles,” 190 but rather a result of the
prosecution’s “personal interpretation of his obligations and of the
interests at stake.” 191 Whatever the reason, the lack of resolution of
these issues increases the probability that they are likely to reemerge in the future.
VI. PART FOUR: CONCLUSION

The Lubanga stay and the Haradinaj acquittals resulted from
protection issues concerning individuals involved in the respective
court proceedings. In both cases, the trial chambers were hasty and
dismissive of protection concerns and used their discretion to
prioritize expediency over the careful analysis of concerns voiced by
individuals who felt unsafe as a result of their involvement with the
respective courts. As described earlier in this article, there are
numerous causes of the lengthy proceedings at the ICC and ICTY,
and delays appear to plague the pre-trial stage most of all. It is
dangerous, therefore, for judges to import the pressure to speed up
trials to the context of witness protection, a vital component of the
credibility and feasibility of international criminal trials.

190

Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶ 38.
Id. ¶ 39, quoting The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Defence Response
to the Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s
decision of 8 July 2010 to stay the proceedings for abuse of process, ¶ 69 (Aug. 9,
2010).
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The Haradinaj Appeals Chamber took an extreme position in
favor of witness’s rights and provided guidance to the Trial Chamber
concerning the importance of proceedings that are free of witness
intimidation and fear. The Appeals Chamber criticized decisions
that were impatient with witnesses’ needs and skeptical of the
likelihood of witnesses testifying if given more time. The Lubanga
Appeals Chamber focused on defining the prosecution’s actions as
non-compliant without addressing the underlying reasons for its noncompliance. Ignoring the reasons for non-compliance was a mistake
because the Appeals Chamber failed to resolve whether the Trial
Chamber was proper in dismissing controversial protection issues
without allowing parties to fully present their views.
Notwithstanding the failure of the Lubanga Appeals Chamber to
address it directly, the lesson to be learned from both Haradinaj and
Lubanga is that trial chambers must set aside the priority of
expediency and allow themselves to be checked by parties and
participants of the court regarding matters of witness protection.
Lubanga and Haradinaj demonstrate that expediency is a
major preoccupation of international tribunals to the extent that it
influences judges’ assessments concerning the safety and security of
those involved with the courts. These two cases are not, however,
isolated examples. Rather, they are the most recent cases of a
longer-standing trend, in which the protection of those involved in
court proceedings is trumped by other concerns. For example, in
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, the ICTY Trial
Chamber denied a request to grant anonymity to witnesses, stating
that “the rights of the accused are made the first consideration, and
the need to protect victims and witnesses is a secondary one.” 192 The
protection of witnesses was considered secondary, so the possibility
for complete non-disclosure of witness’s identities was not permitted
absent exceptional circumstances. 193 The court’s rationale was that
non-disclosure of witnesses was incompatible with an accused’s
rights. 194
The risk of so openly discounting the importance of witness
protection is that potential witnesses may hesitate to participate in

192

Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, Decision on Motion by
Prosecution for Protective Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 20 (July 3, 2000).
193
Id. ¶¶ 23, 26.
194
Id.
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international criminal trials. 195 The danger in not guaranteeing the
safety of endangered witnesses is that the trials will not exist without
voluntary witness participation. 196
Encouraging voluntary
participation is especially important given the “impossibility” of
enforcing compulsory testimony, a problem cited by the ICTR, 197
which is also a difficulty experienced by other tribunals. 198
The mistake at hand is in viewing witness protection in
absolute terms and without patience. This article argues that
alternatives to complete non-disclosure exist to ensure the safety of
witnesses without diminishing the rights of the accused. The full
implementation of witness protective measures, including witness
relocation, if necessary, is one such way to provide for witnesses’
safety prior to disclosures. In this way, not only are the rights of the

195

Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, Motion for Protective
Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶¶ 10–11, (Jan. 10, 2000), quoted in Prosecutor v.
Radoslav Brdanin &Momir Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for
Protective Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 8 (July 3, 2000) (“In the past two years,
there have been increasing instances involving interference with and intimidation
of Tribunal witnesses, including breaches and violations of witness protection
orders (including non-disclosure orders) and other security measures. The
situations range from witnesses having their lives threatened, to repeated instances
of witness statements that have been disclosed to accused and their counsel being
published in the media or otherwise made public (despite the existence of nondisclosure orders), to numerous threatening telephone calls, to loss of jobs or job
opportunities, to witnesses’ general fear and apprehension that they or their
families will be harmed or harassed or otherwise suffer if they testify or co-operate
with the Tribunal. In light of these past breaches of confidentiality and other
serious problems, and their effect on victims and witnesses, the Prosecutor has
grave concerns that the safety of witnesses, their willingness to testify and the
integrity of these proceedings will be substantially jeopardised if witnesses’
identities, whereabouts and statements are prematurely disclosed in circumstances
where they cannot be protected. The Prosecutor submits that the requested
protective measures greatly assist in minimising these concerns.”).
196
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, Motion for Protective
Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 9 (Jan. 10, 2000), quoted in Prosecutor v.
Radoslav Brdanin &Momir Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for
Protective Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 9 (July 3, 2000) (“If witnesses will not
come forward or if witnesses refuse or are otherwise unwilling to testify, there is
little evidence to present. Threats, harassment, violence, bribery and other
intimidation, interference and obstruction of justice are serious problems, for both
the individual witnesses and the Tribunal’s ability to accomplish its mission.”).
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Göran Sluiter, The ICTY and the Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
962, 965–66 (2005).
198
See, e.g., Haradinaj et al. Judgment, supra note 135, ¶ 27.
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accused preserved, but a message is sent to witnesses and others
involved in international courts: courts will do everything in their
power to protect individuals, ensuring that there will be no reason to
regret getting involved in the international criminal justice system.
Defendants also stand to benefit from courts prioritizing witness
protection, as they are less likely to suffer delays that result from
appeals concerning such witness protection matters. Finally, the
courts, by attending more diligently to their witnesses’ needs and by
involving parties and participants in witness protection decisions,
will enhance their legitimacy and encourage greater cooperation
among current and potential witnesses. All that is needed in order to
implement this alternative is patience from judges, parties, and the
general public and understanding for the delays that may result from
addressing this priority.


















Confirmation of
Charges Hearing Start

Custody

Arrest

Accused

11/28/06

11/9/06

3/17/06

3/16/06

Thomas
Lubanga
Dyilo (DRC)

7/18/08

6/27/08

10/17/07

10/17/07

Germain
Katanga
(DRC)

9/26/08

7/18/08

6/27/08

2/7/08

2/6/08

Matheiu
Ngudjolo
Chui (DRC)
at large

Bosco
Ntaganda
(DRC)

pending

10/11/10

10/11/10

Callixte
Mbarushimana
(DRC)

1/12/09

7/3/08

5/24/08

Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo
(CAR)

at large

Joseph Kony
(Uganda)

6/15/09

1/15/09

Confirmation of
Charges Hearing End

9/26/08

AVERAGE:

0.8*

7/12/2011*

1/29/07

11/22/10

Decision on
Confirmation of
Charges

11/24/09

1/26/09

11/24/09

Commencement of
Trial

2.3

2.1

2.4

2.9

0.6

1.8

Time Between Custody
and Beginning of Trial
(Years)

0.9

0.9

0.9

1

Time Between Custody
and Decision on
Charges (Years)
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Annex 1

Arrest

Accused
at large

Joseph
Kony
(Uganda)
at large

Vincent
Otti
(Uganda)
at large

Okot
Odhiambo
(Uganda)
at large

Dominic
Ongwen
(Uganda)
deceased
8/12/06

Raska
Lukwiya
(Uganda)

at large

Ahmad
Muhammad
Harun
(Sudan)

at large

Ali Muhammad
Alo Abd-AlRahman (Sudan)

Custody
Confirmation of
Charges Hearing
Start
Confirmation of
Charges Hearing
End
Decision on
Confirmation of
Charges
Commencement
of Trial
Custody and
Beginning of
Trial (Years)
Custody and
Decision on
Charges (Years)

Omar Hassan



Ahmad Al Bashir (Sudan)

at large
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Rejection of Appeal

Decision on
Confirmation of Charges

Confirmation of Charges
Hearing End

Confirmation of Charges
Hearing Start

Custody

Appearance

Adapted Columns for
Accused Individuals Who
Voluntarily Appeared

4/23/10

2/8/10

10/29/09

10/19/09

n/a

5/18/09

Bahar Idriss
Abu Garda
(Sudan)

7/12/2011*

12/8/10

12/8/10

n/a

6/17/10

Abdallah Banda
Abakaer Nourain
(Sudan)

7/12/2011*

12/8/10

12/8/10

n/a

6/17/10

Saleh
Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus
(Sudan)

1.1*

0.7

1.1*

Time Between 1st
Appearance and Decision
on Charges (Years)

AVERAGE:

0.7



401
HEIDI L. HANSBERRY

2011]

*Italicized text denotes an absence of decision or action as of 7/12/11, and these data points
are excluded from average calculations.

Source: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/

